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Introduction 
The rhetoric on abortion continues to embattle and confuse "pro-choice" 
and "pro-life", "liberals" and "conservatives" alike. Many "liberals" 
complain that it is irrational and brutal to expect a woman to die so that her 
unborn child may live. Abortion should be permitted basically on demand, 
certainly in cases where the health and life of the woman are at risk, and 
even in cases of incest or rape. Besides, they remind us, it is legal. In 
contrast, many "conservatives" argue that abortion can never be 
rationalized or permitted, as it is fundamentally immoral to kill an unborn 
child who is an innocent human being, no matter what the circumstances or 
the law - regardless of the woman's health, life, incest or rape. At times it 
seems that the advocates of either position are "talking past" each other, 
oblivious to the possibility of any moral legitimacy in each other's position. 
Further, there seems as yet to be no structured or principled means 
commonly acceptable to both "camps" by which to circumvent this highly 
politicized standoff or to address these tragic moral dilemmas. 
To a significant degree this standoff is often due to misinformation or 
to a reluctance to make some important moral distinctions. One moral 
distinction is between: (I) inherently bad actions (e.g., abortion) and (2) 
inherently good (or neutral) medical actions which are permitted, even 
though bad effects would result, in order to save the life of the mother (e.g., 
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the gIVIng of chemotherapy treatments, or the removal of a cancerous 
uterus, etc.). Another moral distinction is between directly and indirectly 
voluntary actions (that is, between directly willing an evil , and indirectly 
allowing an evil to take place). Once these important moral distinctions are 
correctly understood, then conditions allow us to apply a common moral 
principle to this standoff, rather than leaving such a vital issue up to 
personal emotions or to unprincipled political compromise. These 
distinctions can also be applied to the many other issues related to abortion, 
e.g., destructive human fetal and human embryo research, and human 
cloning (which inherently requires destructive human embryo research). 
The common moral principle oft(!n used in these difficult situations is 
that found in the time-honored theory of natural law' known as the 
principle of double effect.2 Properly understood, the principle of double 
effect evolved in order to address just these types of difficult moral 
dilemmas - in this case where both of the lives of those affected are 
innocent, and yet something must be done or will happen which inevitably 
will endanger one of these two innocent lives. The obvious application for 
our purposes here is when a woman., who is herself an innocent human 
being, whose human life is precious and must be respected, is pregnant 
with an unborn child, who is likewise an innocent human being (from 
fertilization onwards), and whose life is also precious and must be 
respected. Since, as natural law th,;:ory holds, one may never directly 
intend to kill an innocent human being/ under what circumstances and 
conditions is it morally permissible: (I) for a woman to undergo an 
abortion procedure, or (2) for a physician to help one of these innocents to 
live, by means of other and different morally legitimate medical actions, 
and yet permit or allow the other, unfortunately, to die? 
These are really two different a.nd separate moral questions, and so 
must be approached differently. One concerns abortion procedures; the 
other concerns other medical actions or procedures which could be taken in 
order to save the life of the mother (and vice versa) when urgent and valid 
medical circumstances arise. The solutions to these two very different 
questions, I would suggest, could be applied in helping to resolve at least 
the extremes of the current abortion debates, without at all compromising 
long established moral principles. The resolution lies in seeing the moral 
distinction between these two questions and then properly applying the 
well-established principle of double effect. 
But before developing thi s often used application of the principle of 
double effect in more detail , it is important to stave off just a few possible 
objections by clarifying quite briefly some facts about natural law ethical 
theory - a theory often misunderstood, misinterpreted, or misapplied down 
through the years. 
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Natural Law Ethkal Theory4 
Some examples of what natural law ethical theory is, or is not, and 
why it could be considered useful in this debate, include the following: 
I. It is a philosophical ethical theory, not a theological one - although 
it can be and is related to theology. That is, natural law ethical theory aids 
us in understanding which human actions are morally right or wrong 
through the aid of human reason alone - without the use of Divine 
Revelation or the teachings of the Magisterium. It has been studied and 
refined over the centuries as a means of addressing what is the morally 
right thing for us to do when faced with genuine moral dilemmas. It is not 
some new, brash, untried or unscrutinized moral theory. One might agree 
that although natural law ethical theory is by definition not a case of 
imposing one's religious or belief system on others, it still might be 
objected that it is a case of imposing one's ethical system on others. 
In response one could point to several facts: first, natural law ethical 
theory can well hold its own in complicated academic and heated debates 
compared to other philosophical ethical theories (although I will not get 
into that here). Second, there is simply no such thing as a "neutral" ethics 
which might be "perfect" for our pluralistic society - no matter now 
convenient such "neutrality" might be. This includes the ethical theories of 
utilitarianism, relativism or communitarianism - none of which are 
"neutral" and all of which are normative ethical theories. Therefore we are 
in fact constantly "forcing" some non-neutral philosophical or social ethical 
theory on others in this country, whether we want to acknowledge that fact 
or not. Finally, as pointed out in the Declaration on Procured Abortion: "It 
is true that it is not the task of the law to choose between points of view or 
to impose one rather than another. But the life of the child takes 
precedence over all opinions. One cannot invoke freedom of thought to 
destroy this Iife."s 
2. In counter-distinction to many other ethical theories, natural law 
ethical theory is proximately and objectively grounded in our objectively 
knowable human nature, i.e., on what is really good or bad for us as human 
beings - as individuals and as members of our human communities.6 It is 
not simply deduced from non-empirically derived and questionable 
"philosophical" premises or religious dogmas, or from variable emotions or 
personal opinions. For example, it is wrong to use cocaine because our 
human natures are such that cocaine eventually seriously harms, sometimes 
even destroys us - body, mind, and spirit. It can also seriously harm others 
close to us as well as to our human society at large. That is just the way we 
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human beings are "made"; and we can know this fact objectively and 
empirically. 
3. Because the basic precepts of natural law theory are proximately 
grounded on an objectively knowable human nature, they are applicable to 
all human beings, precisely because we all possess such human natures. 
The possession of natures which are specifically human is precisely what 
we all have in common . This is true regardless of time, culture, 
background, race, sex, religion or political affiliation. 
4. Thus, if properly understood and applied, natural law theory should 
be ideal for our "pluralistic" society -- since all of our citizens are human 
beings, and hold at least that in common. What is fundamentally good or 
bad for human beings in general will hold for us all. Certainly secondary 
differences must be taken into consideration; but the primary precepts of 
the natural law will be the same for all of our citizens by virtue of their 
common humanity, and these precepts cannot be changed because our 
human natures, and what is objectively and fundamentally good or bad for 
them, cannot change. It calls, indeed, for simply minimal moral 
requirements to guide a human polity. 
Finally, in natural law ethical theory, there are three determinants of a 
human action which determine its rightness or wrongness, and all three 
determinants must be good in order for an action to be considered good .7 
I. the act itself (what the agent wills), which is either good or evil by 
its very nature (a major tenet of natural law ethical theory which is rejected 
by contemporary " proportionalist" interpretations of natural law theory)8 -
e.g., the act of abortion is inherently wrong; the acts of administering 
chemotherapy or performing a hy;terectomy are inherently good (or 
indifferent) actions. 
2. the motive or intention (consciously willed), which is what the 
agent wants to achieve by the act - i.e., the end, purpose or goal of the 
action; why the action is performed - e.g., in order to kill a person; or in 
order to evade social disgrace, better spacing of children, or cure a deadly 
disease. 
3. the circumstances, which are the accidental surroundings of the 
act, which include the consequences of the act - e.g., the act of intercourse 
with a willing spouse or forcibly with a stranger or one's child; or that there 
are no other medical treatments available. 
It is critical to understand that an action which is evil in itself (by its 
nature) cannot be made good or indifferent by any intentions, goals or 
circumstances - no matter how good or praiseworthy these are per se. On 
the other hand, an action which is good in itself (by its nature) can be 
morally ruined by any gravely bad intentions or circumstances. These three 
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determinants of a moral act are explicitly incorporated into the following 
short explication and clarification of the principle of double effect. 
The Principle of Double Effect 
That part of natural law ethical theory referred to as the principle of 
double effect was gradually refined over the centuries in order to meet the 
unfortunate but very real moral dilemmas in which, no matter what is 
reasonably done, one or more innocent human beings may be harmed or 
even die in the process of resolving the dilemma. The following 
explication of the principle of double effect, as well as its four necessary 
conditions, are taken almost verbatim from the work of Austin Fagothey, 
Right and Reason. Its application to the abortion debate will be 
specifically indicated under each condition of the principle. 
The principle of double effect is based on the fact that evil must never 
be directly and voluntarily willed for its own sake, and must never be 
willed either as an end or as a means to an end. Nor may evil ever be 
directly willed as a foreseen but unwanted consequence. But evil can be 
reduced to an incidental and unavoidable by-product in the achievement of 
some morally licit good the person is rightfully seeking.9 
Thus, although I am never allowed to will evil,lo I am not always 
bound to prevent the existence of evil. Just as I may tolerate the existence 
of evils in the world at large, since I could not cure them without bringing 
other evils on myself or my neighbor, so I may sometimes tolerate evil 
consequences from my own actions, if to abstain from such actions would 
bring a grave evil on myself or others. Unfortunately then, as is sometimes 
the case, I cannot realistically in fact will a legitimate good, without at the 
same time permitting the existence of an evil which in the very nature of 
things is inseparably bound up with the good I will. But I must not do so 
indiscriminately. In short, sometimes I am bound to prevent evil, and in 
these cases it would be wrong for me to permit it. But sometimes I am 
permitted to allow evil effects to take place. How can we distinguish 
between these two different cases? 11 This is where the principle of double 
effect comes in . 
The principle of double effect holds that it is morally allowable to 
perform an action that has a bad effect only under the following conditions: 
I. Once again, the action to be performed must be good in itself, or at 
least indifferent. 
This is evident, for if the act is evil of its very nature, nothing can make it 
good or indifferent. Evil would then be chosen directly, either as an end or 
as a means to an end, and there could be no question of merely permitting 
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or tolerating it. '2 If the action is fundamentally and inherently morally 
illicit, then it cannot be morally permitted regardless of any good intentions 
or goals, or under any good circumstalnces. 
Application: The act of abortion of its ve~y nature is inherently evil, 
because it is the intentional and direct killing of an innocent human being. 
This would apply to all abortions, including those in the case of rape and 
incest (and to those involving human fetal and human embryo research, and 
human cloning). Therefore it is never morally permissible to undergo an 
abortion procedure. The principle of double effect as applied to the case of 
abortion renders abortion procedures morally illicit, since the action by its 
very nature is evil. However, other possible medical actions, e.g. , the 
giving of chemotherapy or the removal of a cancerous uterus - morally 
good or at least neutral acts - could be permitted in order to save the life of 
the mother, even if it could possibly result in the unintended death of the 
unborn child, as long as all of the other three following conditions are also 
met. 13 
2. The evil effect must not be di rectly intended for itself but only 
permitted to bappen as an accidental by-product of the act 
14 performed. 
Application: In the case of abortion procedures, the death of the 
unborn child is directly intended and therefore is morally illicit. On the 
other hand, in the use of chemotherapy or the performance of a 
hysterectomy to remove a cancerow; uterus. etc. , the death of the unborn 
child may not be directly intended. but only permitted or allowed as a 
possible by-product. 15 
3. The good intended must not be obtained by means of the evil effects. 
The evil must not be an actual factor in the accomplishment of the good. ' 6 
Application: In the case of abortion procedures. the death of the 
unborn child may not be used as a means of limiting family size, preventing 
birth defects, enhancing a career, etc. (all legitimately good or neutral ends 
in themselves.) .17 On the other hand, the curing of the potentially deadly 
disease of cancer could be obtained by means of the morally acceptable 
actions of the administration of chemotherapy or the performance of a 
hysterectomy. The death of the unborn child is not the means used to cure 
the cancer. 
4. There must be a reasonably glrave reason for permitting the evil 
effect. 
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If the good is slight and the evil great, the evil can hardly be called 
incidental. If there is any other way of getting the good effect without the 
bad effect, this other way must be taken. 18 
Application: In the case of abortion procedures, to maintain a slim 
figure, to have a child of a certain sex, to prevent the birth of a child with 
defects, or to evade social embarrassment would not be reasonably grave 
reasons for permitting the unintended and unavoidable death of the unborn 
child. On the other hand, to give chemotherapy or to perform a 
hysterectomy in order to remove a cancerous uterus, etc. , to preserve the 
life of the mother (who is also an innocent human being) would be a 
reasonably grave reason for permitting or allowing the unintended and 
unavoidable death of the unborn child. If there is any other reasonable 
medical treatment available to save the life of the mother which would not 
entail undue harm or death to the unborn child, then it must be chosen 
instead .19 
And finally, note that these examples of "other medical actions" are 
not morally licit unless all four conditions of the principle of double effect 
are fulfilled. If anyone of them is not satisfied, even though the other three 
are, those medical actions are morally wrong. 
Conclusion 
In short, a pregnant woman who is faced with the grim reality of 
impending death short of the use of, e .g., chemotherapy or hysterectomy, 
may use these and other morally licit medical treatments and procedures for 
the reasonably grave reason of saving her life, as long as the death of her 
unborn child is not directly intended as the end (or purpose) of using these 
procedures, or is the means by which her life is saved, and no other 
reasonable medical treatment is available. However, the directly intended 
death of an unborn child by means of procured abortion remains morally 
indefensible - even to save the life of the mother, or for the best of 
intentions, or under very difficult circumstances - even in the case of incest 
and rape. 
There is too much at stake to leave the lives of so many millions of 
innocents - both women and unborn children - up to mere personal 
whimsy or political bartering. The social fiber in this country has been 
shattered and stretched to the limit. Presented here is at least a common 
moral means of considerably reducing the rancor and misinformation 
swirling about these abortion debates . The proper understanding and 
application of the principle of double effect offers a commonly accepted, 
morally legitimate, objectively grounded basis for clarifying the important 
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moral distinctions which need to be made within these very tragic and 
difficult moral dilemmas - one on which most of us could reasonably 
agree. 
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